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RULE 11 AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS
COMMENTS OF RATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION

In response to the Call for Comments
Issued by the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules
Judicial Conference of the United States
November 1, 1990

INTRODUCTION

The National Bar Association (tlNBA

tI

),

by its attorneys,

hereby submits Comments on Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 ("Rule 11") in
response to the Call for Comments issued by the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules, Judicial Conference of the United
States (dated August, 1990).

In the Call for Comments, the

Advisory Committee on Civil Rules requests comments on various
aspects of Rule 11.

See, 901 F.2d CLXVII (AUgUst 1, 1990).

The National Bar Association was founded in 1925, and is an
o~ganization

comprised of African-American attorneys throughout

the United States.

Since its founding, the NBA has been involved

in promoting civil rights activities in an effort to improve the
educational, societal, and economic welfare of African-Americans
and other minorities and has long been interested in the effect
that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might have on limiting
access to the courts and the impact on sole practitioners and
small law firms.

In its Call for Comments, the Advisory

Committee outlines ten (10) inquiries on issues of particular
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importance.

In that vein, the Comments of the NBA addresses

specifically Inquiry #4, which requests discussion and
suggestions on the impact of Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights
plaintiffs and lawyers. l
The NBA recognizes that the broad discretion afforded
district court judges in determining the appropriate Rule 11
sanction was intended as a Itsafety value

lt

to reduce the pressure

of mandatory sanctions that shall be imposed after a finding of a
Rule 11 violation.

To that extent, the NBA proposes that the

basic principle governing sanctions imposed in civil rights
cases, be the least severe sanction adequate to serve the purpose
of the rule.

NBA submits that to meet the deterrent purpose of

Rule 11, the district court judge should consider a wide range of
possible nonmonetary sanctions, coupled witn the consideration of
a host of mitigating factors, before resorting to monetary
sanctions.
NBA asserts that the abuse of discretion standard should be

applied in reviewing a finding of a Rule 11 violation.

The

choice of sanction, however, should be reviewed under a
heightened level of scrutiny in civil rights cases to ensure that
sanctions do not chill the advocacy of the civil rights lawyer.

lInquiry #4 states as follows: Is there evidence that the
sanctions rules have been administered unfairly to any particular
group of lawyers or parties? Particular concern has been
expressed about the effect on civil rights plaintiffs. Bearing
in mind that some categories of cases are extremely unlikely to
result in sanctionable conduct • • • it cannot be expected that
sanctions will be equally distributed among all categories of
federal civil litigation. Data may be subject to conflicting
interpretation. If this is a problem, could an amendment of the
Rules alleviate or eliminate it? Id. at CLXXVI.
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See Blue v. U.S. Department of the Army, Nos. 88-1364, et seq.,
at 33 (Slip Op.) (4th Cir., .September 18, 1990).

Of course,

critics would argue why should such a dichotomy of standard of
review be applied in Rule 11 cases involving civil rights.

Those

critics need only revisit the long line of U.S. Supreme Court
cases that have helped shape the fabric of today's society to
realize that society as a whole benefits when lawyers undertake
to represent cash-trapped clients seeking to vindicate a
constitutional right when those same attorneys are forsaking the
prestige and money associated with representing clients with deep
pockets.

Common sense and the almighty dollar tilt the balance

of the scales of justice in favor of the practice where money and
. prestige weighs heavily against altruistic rewards and the common
man.

A

natural consequence of such circumstance creates a

disadvantage for the common man whose lawyer may fall under the
sanctions imposed by Rule 11, while industry, unlike the common
man, will simply be able to hire another lawyer.

A chilling

thought.
This Comment addresses the history, function and the
application of Rule 11 in civil rights cases.

In addition, the

Comment examines the application of Rule 11 in a recent civil
rights case to illustrate how the indiscriminate application of
sanctions have a chilling effect on the future practice of civil
rights lawyers.

-4I.

HISTORY

.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is intended to deter
abuse of the legal process by allowing courts to sanction
attorneys who file frivolous pleadings and papers.

Apparently

the original rule as initially promulgated was not effective in
deterring abuses,2 thus the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 was
intended to ttreduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions
. . • by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and
enforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions."
Amended Rule 11 Advisory Committee Notes.

The full text of Rule

11 reads as follows:
Every pleading, motion and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record
in the attorney's ind~vidual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign the
party's pleading, motion, or other paper and
state the party's address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity
that the averments of an answer under oath
must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, infor.mation and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension,
2The Advisory Comments to amended Rule 11 show that the
amendment's primary purpose was for deterrence of dilatory or
abusive pretrial tactics and the streamlining of litigation. See
Advisory Comments. See also Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th eire 1986).
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modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, .such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion or other paper is not signed, it shall
be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention
of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion or other paper is signed in violation
of this rule, the court upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who found it a represented party, or
both an appropriate sanction which may
include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses, incurred because of the filing of
the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
As called for by Rule 11, an attorney signing any pleading,

motion or other paper in federal court warrants that the pleading
is well grounded in fact, that it is warranted by existing law,
or a good faith argument for modification or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not filed for an improper purpose.

See

Eastway Construction Corporation v. City of New York, 762 F.2d
243, 254 n.7 (2nd Cir. 1985) ("Eastway III).

The amended rule was

"designed to create an affirmative duty of investigation both as
to law and as to fact before motions are filed," and it creates
an objective "standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances."

Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198

(1983); Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801
F.2d at 1536.

This expanded application of Rule 11 sanctions

gave rise to concerns that the Rule might chill creativity in
advocacy, and

~pede

on the traditional ability of the common law

to adjust to changing situations.

In response to this concern,

the Advisory Committee noted the following:

-6-

[T]he rule is not intended to chill an
attorney's enthusiasm, or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories. The
court is expected to avoid using the wisdom
of hindsight and should test the signer's
conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to
believe at the time the pleading, motion or
other paper was submitted.
Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. at 199.

See also, In re

Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 991 (6th Cir. 1987).

The National Bar

believes that this philosophy is sound and should be applied in
all cases filed including civil rights cases.
II.

OPERATION OF Rule 11

Rule 11 applies to the filing of "pleadings, motions, and
other paper" in a civil action and the rule requires that such a
paper be signed.

The purpose of the signature is to attach

responsibility upon a specific person for those matters that are
the subject of the certificate.
address two issues:

The certificate is meant to

the problem of frivolous filings and the

problem of misusing judicial procedures as a weapon for personal
or economic harassment.

Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780

F.2d 823, 830 (9th eire 1986).
The Advisory Committee has stated that sanctions should be
imposed on a party where appropriate under the circumstances and
the allocation of sanctions among attorneys and their clients was
a matter of judicial "discretion."

See Advisory Committee's Note

to 1983 amendment; cf. Browning Debenture Holders Committee v.
DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Attorneys, law firms and clients have all been subject to
Rule 11 sanctions.

See,~,

Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th

Cir. 1985) (attorney sanctioned); Calloway v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 650 F.Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (attorney
and law firm sanctioned); Robinson v. National Cash Register Co.,
a08 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987) (attorney and client sanctioned);
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985) (client
sanctioned).

By category, a 1985 survey of one-hundred (100)

Rule 11 cases found that attorneys were sanctioned in 38% of the
cases; clients in 20%; and both in 18%.

See Nelken, Sanctions

Under Amended Federal Rule 11 -- Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo.L.J. 1313,
1329 (1986).
With respect to attorneys, a court may· consider the fact
that an attorney has vast experience in litigation involving
political discrimination and thus should know when certain claims
are groundless.

Quiros v. Hernandez Colon, 800 F.2d 1, 2 (1st

Cir. 1986) (Rule 11 award here serves to sanction and deter
filing of meritless claims and to compensate those forced"to
defend them; Due Process claims were groundless).
The attorney may also be jointly and severally liable for a
Rule 11 judgment against the client, in large part because the
attorney has the principal responsibility for complying with the
rule.

A fortiori, as long as the attorney has not been mislead

by the client, then it is the attorney's conduct that is the
proximate cause of the Rule 11 violation.

Calloway v. Marvel

Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1477 (2nd Cir. 1988) (court

-8-

has power to impose joint and several liability on portion of
sanctions resulting from

pa~ty's

misconduct where attorney should

have known that the misconduct violated Rule 11).

The reason

behind holding the attorney liable, and not the client, is
because of professional responsibility, the attorney is held to
know of the wrongfulness of the conduct and because of
professional responsibility should act to prevent it.

Id. at

1474.
The fact that the court can sanction only the attorney and
not the client leaves the court with the flexibility in the
myriad of situations in which attorneys fees or other sanctions
may be assessed.

Quiros v. Hernandez Colon, 800 F.2d at 2 (court

. presided over the proceedings and is uniquely qualified to
perform the balancing of equities that is an integral part of the
proceedings for award of attorney fees).
It is unclear in at least the Second Judicial Circuit as to
whether a client may be jointly and severally liable for that
portion of sanctions resulting from the lawyer's misconduct.

Id.

Sanctions, however, against the client is appropriate when a
client either knowingly authorized or participated in the filing
of a paper that violated Rule 11.

Calloway v. Marvel

Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d at 1474-75.

Sanctions on the party

alone are also appropriate when a client misleads an attorney as
to facts or the purpose of a lawsuit, if the attorney
nevertheless had an objectively reasonable basis to sign the
papers in question.

See Friedqood v. Axelrod, 593 F.Supp. 395

(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiff lied to attorney).

-9III.

THE DISCRETIONARY SANCTION TOOL POR THE COURT

It is within the discretion of the district court judge to
find that a Rule 11 violation has occurred.

Once the court finds

that a Rule 11 violation has occurred, the judge must award
sanctions.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 ("If a pleading, motion or other

paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon a
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose • . . an
appropriate sanction");

~

also westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770

F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (tI(T]he new provision mandates
the imposition of sanctions when warranted by groundless or
abusive practice").

The court, however, has the discretion to

decide what type of sanction to award.

See,~,

Fed.R.Civ.P.

11 Advisory Committee's Note (the court "has discretion to tailor
sanctions to the particular facts of the case"); Eastway I, 762
F.2d at 254 n.7. ("district courts retain broad discretion in
fashioning sanctions • • •

. .

sanctions be appropriate.

See~,

u )

Rule 11 only requires that
In re Yaqman, 796 F.2d 1165,

1184-85, opinion amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 450 (1987).
The uconcept of discretion implies that a decision is lawful
at any point within the outer limits of the range of choices
appropriate to the issue at hand; at the same time, a decision is
outside of those limits, exceeds, or as it is infelicitously
said, uabuses" allowable discretion.
v~

It

See Eastway Const. Corp.

City of New York, 821 F. 2d 121, 123 (2nd Cir. 1987). (tiEastway

lIn); cf. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGrow, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974
(2nd eire 1987) (defining abuse of discretion).
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THE DISCRETION IN CHOOSING THE

TYPE OP

APPROPR~E

SANCTION

The broad discretion afforded district courts is reflected
in the numerous types of sanctions that may be imposed under Rule
11.

To this extent, the Advisory Committee mentions the district

court's consideration of the status of a litigant as represented
or pro se; the state of mind of an attorney when the paper was
signed; the length of time an attorney has to investigate a claim
or defense; and whether the sanction should be imposed on the
attorney personally, the client, or both.
There is, however, a natural tendency to impose sanctions
that include attorney's fees and reasonable costs provided by the
rule.

Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877

(5th eire 1988).

Financial penalties have been "qharacterized as

perhaps the most effective way to deter a powerful and wealthy
party from bringing frivolous or vexatious litigation; or from
maintaining a baseless position in defense of another party's
claim.
1987).

It

Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir.
The monetary sanctions awarded in the estimated 600 to

over 1000 Rule 11 decisions appearing in the last six years have
reached amounts as high as $400,000.

See Note, Insuring Rule 11

Sanctions, 88 Mich.L.Rev. 344 n.2 & 3.

One survey indicated that

the average Rule 11 sanction is $44,118 and the median sanction
is $5,135.

Id. at 345 (citing T. willging, The Rule 11

Sanctioning Process, 30, 80 (1988).

Moreover, some courts impose

monetary sanctions that bear no relation to the expenses and

-11attorney fees of the opposing party.

See Note, Insuring Rule 11

Sanctions, 88 Mich.L.Rev. at 353 n.62 (1988) (citations omitted).
The history of the rule supports the argument that the
tlrulemakers inserted the discretionary language in Rule 11 in
response to concerns that mandatory sanctions would chill the
adversarial process.
supra.

II

See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc.,

In other words, the "broad discretion in determining

sanctions was intended as a 'safety valve' to reduce the pressure
of mandatory sanctions.
836 F.2d at 877.

II

Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc.,

Nowhere is the Itsafety valve" concern more

evident than in civil rights cases, where the pressure of
mandatory sanctions chills the advocacy of civil rights
attorneys.
"As a matter of empirical analysis, however, it may be next
to impossible to assess the full extent of the chilling effect,
if any, created by the rule."

See Note, Insuring 11 Sanctions,

88 Mich.L.Rev. at 382 n. 240 (citations therein).

Nonetheless,

the NBA members who disproportionately handle civil rights cases
can unequivocally attest to the chilling effect of sanctions in
their practice.

Further, where Rule 11 is used to curb

litigation abuses in civil cases in general, there is usually a
profit concern motivating the lawsuit.

Where, however,

litigation abuse is being curbed by Rule 11 sanctions in civil
rights cases there is seldom the backdrop of profit motivating
the filing of the suit.

The distinction is important because it

helps to illuminate the logic of how sanctions would chill an
area of law practice where profit is not the primary motivation

-12for bringing the suit.

The result could drive these members out

of the field of civil rights law altogether.

What a paradoxl

The "resort to the courts to seek vindication of
constitutional right·s is a different matter from the oppressive,
malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely
private gain. tt

N .A.A. C. P.

v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 443 (1962).

Monetary sanctions chill the adversarial process in civil rights
cases because "lawsuits attacking racial discrimination, [ ] are
neither very profitable nor very popular.
the

u.s.

It

Id.

As recognized by

Supreme Court, the problem that civil rights clients

face is the "apparent dearth of lawyers who are willing to
undertake such litigation.

II

Id.

The reason for the lack of

attorneys who practice civil rights is clear:

"lawsuits

attacking racial discrimination, [ ] are neither very profitable
nor very popular."

Id.

II

They are not an object of general

competi tion among [ ] lawyers. t.

Id.

Particularly in civil rights cases, judges should be
encouraged to utilize innovative approaches as a preferred
deterrence to monetary sanctions in light of the dearth of
attorneys who choose to practice civil rights law and the
unprofitabilty of practicing civil rights law.

District court

judges should, particularly in civil rights cases, consider a
"wide range of alternative possible sanctions for violations of
the rule

II

and the court' s

I.

choice of deterrence [should be

deemed] appropriate when it is the minimum that will serve to
adequately deter the undesirable behavior."

Doering v. Union

County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3rd Cir. 1988).

-13To date, district court judges implementing Rule 11 have
resorted to a variety of nonmonetary sanctions, including
reprimanding attorneys,

~, ~,

In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004 (9th

Cir. 1986) ("[T]he public admonishment of this opinion is
sufficient sanction U), striking pleadings or papers,

~, ~,

Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d at 878 (U[D]istrict
courts may theoretically still dismiss baseless claims or
defenses as sanctions • • • • tI), barring attorneys from the
court,

~,

~,

Kendrick v. Zandides, 609 F.Supp. 1162, 1173

(N.D. Cal. 1985) (ordering attorney to show cause why he should
not be suspended for practicing in the Northern District of
California), and referring attorneys to state disciplinary
"boards,

~, ~,

Lepucki v. Van Wor.mer, 765 F.2d 86, 89 (7th

Cir.) cert. denied, 474

u.s.

827 (1985) (referring attorney to

state disciplinary body for investigation).
As stated by the Fifth Circuit, and hereby endorsed by the
NBA with respect to civil rights cases, tithe basic principle
governing the choice of sanctions is that the least severe
sanction adequate to serve the purpose should be imposed."
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d at 878;

~

also

Boazman v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212-13 (5th
Cir. 1976); Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1136 (4th Cir. 1974);
Industrial Building Materials Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437
F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1970).

The least severe sanction

adequate to meet the purpose of Rule 11 has been embraced by both
the Fifth Circuit and the Third Circuit.

See Lieb v. Topstone

Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3rd Cir. 1986) (UInfluenced
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by the particular facts of a case, the court may decide that the
circumstances warrant

~position

of only part of the adversary's

expenses or perhaps only a reprimand[.]

In other cases,

reference to a bar association grievance committee may be
appropriate").
To serve the deterrent purpose behind the rule, particularly

in civil rights cases, district court judges should carefully
"choose sanctions that foster the appropriate purpose of the
rule, depending upon the parties, the violation, and the nature
of the case."

Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d at

877.
The

NBA

suggests that, in civil rights cases, sanctions of

first resort should be "educational and rehabilitative in
character and, as such, tailored to the particular wrong."
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d at 877.

See

The

educational effect of sanctions might be enhanced even by
requiring some form of legal education,

~

Thomas v. Capital

Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d at 878, or, "[w]hat is appropriate
may be a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed
reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary
sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the circumstances."
Id. at 878.
One district court exemplified the type of innovation which
the NBA subscribes to, in requiring an errant attorney to
circulate the court's opinion criticizing this conduct through
his own firm.

Heuttiq & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors

Council, 582 F.Supp. 1519 (N.D.Cal. 1984), aff'd 790 F.2d 1421
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(

(9th Cir. 1986);

~

also Schwarzer, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201-02

(1985) (judges cautioned not to violate Rule 11; the sting of
public criticism delivered from the bench, while potentially
constructive, can also damage a lawyer's reputation and career).
As noted by Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, other sanctions that
could be appropriate in taking the place of monetary awards
include publication, an order barring an attorney from appearing
for a period of time, reprimand, dismissal of baseless claims or
defenses ••• ", or even ordering lithe attorney[] who violated the
rule to circulate in [his or her] firm a copy of the opinion in
which the pleadings were criticized.

II

Doering v. Union County

Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d at 194 (citing Gaiard v.
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3rd eire 1987); Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124,. 129 (N.D.Cal.
1984) rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th eire 1986».
B.

HITlGATION

In civil rights cases in particular, the NBA proposes that
courts consider as instructive the mitigating factors articulated
by Judge A. Leon Higginbothom in the context of Rule 11; these
considerations should also be relevant to the extent of any
monetary award:

(1)

attorney's history of filing frivolous
actions or alternatively, his or her
good reputation, Eastway, 637 F.Supp. at
573;

(2)

tithe defendant's need for compensation,
id at 574;

-16-

~

(3 )

the degree of frivolousness, recognizing
that cases do lie along a continuum
rather than neatly falling into either
the frivolous or non-frivolous category
and that Congressional intent, in
promulgating Rule 11 sanctions, was not
to "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or
creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories," Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 Advisory
Committee Notes; ~ also, Napier, 855
F.2d at 1091-1092; Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at
483-484 (liThe rule seeks to strike a
balance between the need to curtail
abuse of the legal system and the need
to encourage creativity and vitality in
the law.")

(4)

"whether the frivolousness also
indicating that a less sophisticated or
expensive response [by the other party]
was required," Napier, 855 F.2d at 1094;
and

(5)

the importance of not discouraging
particular types of litigating which may
provide the basis of legislative and
executive ameliorative actions when the
courts lack power to act.1I Eastway, 637
F.Supp. at 575.

Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d

at 197.
Also, the Seventh Circuit suggests that a court consider
whether the party seeking fees caused the litigation to be longer
than necessary, because a duty of mitigation exists for that
party.

Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards, 830 F.2d

1429, 1430 (7th eire 1987); cf. Schwarzer, 104 F.R.D. at 198-200
(in assessing the damage done, the court should consider the
extent to which it is self-inflicted due to the failure to
mitigate:

If a baseless claim could have been readily disposed

of by summary procedures, there is perhaps, little justification

-17for a claim for attorney's fees and expenses engendered in length
and elaborate proceedings in opposition).
IV •

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

There is a split of opinion among the circuits as to the
proper standard of review to be applied to Rule 11 decisions by
district courts.

Within the Fifth Circuit, there had existed a

divergence of opinion as to the proper standard of review of
district court Rule 11 judgments.

For example, in Robinson v.

National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987) the
court used a three-tiered approach:
In reviewing an order imposing
sanctions, we must examine the aspect of the
order that is being reviewed. Findings of
facts used by the district court to determine
that Rule 11 has been violated are reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard. The
legal conclusion of the district court that a
particular set of facts constitutes a
violation of Rule 11 is reviewed de novo.
The amount and type of the sanction imposed
is examined under the abuse of discretion
standard.
Id. at 1125-26; But see Davis v. Veslan Enterprises, 765 F.2d 494
(5th Cir. 1985) (abuse of discretion standard is appropriate).
In 1988, the Fifth Circuit decided that the "complexity of the
three-tiered standard creates additional work for district courts
and additional issues for appeal
discretion standard.

II

and adopted the abuse of

Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836

F.2d at 883-84.
The three-tier approach first surfaced in Zaldivar v. City
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d at 828; see also Brown v. Federation of

-18State Medical Boards, 830 F.2d at 1434.

Other circuits suggest a

variation of the approach used in Zaldivar v. City of Los
Anaeles, employing an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing
the factual reasons for imposing Rule 11 sanction and the amount
and type of sanctions, while reserving a de

nQYQ

analysis for

reviewing the legal sufficiency of a pleading or motion and the
determination to impose sanctions.

See Donaldson v. Clark, 819

F.2d at 1556; westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d at 1175; Eastway I,
762 F.2d at 254 n. 7.

The D.C. Circuit has even suggested that a

"wide discretion" is available.

See Adams v. Pan American Worla

Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. eire 1987) (court refused to
overturn the district court's denial of sanction stating that "we
-may overturn [the district court's] ruling only if it abused its

'wide discretion' to determine whether grounds exist to support
Rule 11 sanctions.")

Once again, NBA reaffirms its position that

the abuse of discretion standard be applied in reviewing a
finding of a Rule 11 violation.

However, a heightened level of

scrutiny should be applied in reviewing the choice of sanctions
to be imposed.

v.

Rule 11 DISCRETION AND CIVIL RIGHTS CASES

There are two schools of thought regarding the application
of Rule 11 to civil rights cases:

on the one hand, critics argue

that no special treatment should be given to civil rights
litigation, and, on the other hand, critics argue that sanctions
should not chill the advocacy of the practice of civil rights law
which has help shaped America's history.

-19In Perez v. Velez, 629 F. Supp. 734, 737 (S.D.N.Y 1985), the
court said:

"Our responsibility is to take needed punitive

action against irresponsible and unprofessional conduct without
doing damage to the underlying cause of equal rights which the
attorney has served."

Nonetheless, that district court judge

wrote counsel in these cases cannot be permitted to engage with
impunity in conduct of egregious professional responsibility
simply because the frivolous lawsuits they sponsor ,are in the
sensitive civil rights area.

Perez v. Velez, 629 F. Supp. at 737

("litigation frivolous, even though the underlying litigation
here concerns the voting rights of minorities and the court is
particularly mindful of the need not to discourage politically
powerless minority
court").

~oters

from bringing legitimate claims into

The problem is that where political and fundamental

rights are sought in the courts, minority lawyers have sometimes
felt the sting of claims of unprofessional conduct when the
underlying objective is to deter the aim of the litigation, to
wit, obtain political and fundamental rights for their clients.
Some district court judges flatly reject any notion "that
special treatment of sanctions should be given to attorneys who
handle unpopular civil rights claims, particularly those
representing indigent and minority clients.

Oliveri v. Thompson,

803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2nd eire 1986) (all attorneys are to be held
to the same standards of conduct, no matter who their clients
are; dilatory practices of civil rights plaintiffs are as
objectionable as those of defendant) (citing Roadway Express Inc.
v. piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980».
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The NBA does not suggest that civil rights cases should be
immune from the threat of sanctions for violating Rule 11.
Rather, the NBA does strongly advocate that civil rights cases be
treated differently in the type of sanction awarded against civil
rights litigants.

Why?

The undesirability of the case.

"Civil

rights attorneys face hardships in their communities because of
their desire to help the civil rights litigant., and most federal
judges know this.

See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 u.S. at 433.

Oftentimes an attorney's decision to help eradicate
discrimination is not pleasantly received by the community or his
contemporaries.

Cf. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,

488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th eire 1974).

As in Rule 11, "this case can

have an economic impact on his practice which can be considered
by the Court.

II

Id. at 719.

Available empirical d.ata suggests

that Rule 11 does potentially chill the advocacy of civil rights
law.

See,~,

Note, Insuring Rule 11 Sanctions, 88 Mich. L.

Rev. at 382 n. 241 (citing for e.g., Note, Plausible Pleadings:
Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 630
(1987) ("Conflicting notions of plausibility, as much as overly

narrow ones, have a chilling effect on litigation, leading
prudent lawyers to steer wide of even potential implausibility by
avoiding filing nonstandard claims"); Rothstein & Wolfe,
Innovative Attorneys Starting to' Feel Chill From New Rule 11,
Legal Times, Feb. 23, 1987 at 18:10 (Uattorneys unsure of the
boundaries of Rule II's sweep many be refusing to take novel or
risky, but arguably meritorious, cases for fear of being
personally sanctioned

ll

by federal judges); see also Thomas v.

-21Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d at 885 ("If abused, Rule 11
may chill attorneys' [in civil rights cases] enthusiasm and
stifle the creativity of litigants in pursuing novel factual or
legal theories

ll

)).

Civil rights cases, in addition, accounting

for only 7.6% of the civil filings from 1983 to 1985, but
accounted for 22.2% of the Rule 11 cases during the same period;
in contrast, contract claims accounted for 35.7% of all cases,
but only 11.2% of the Rule 11 cases.
Sanctions, 88

~ch.

See Note, Insuring Rule 22

L. Rev. 383 n. 244 (1989) (citing Nelkin,

Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 -- Some "Chilling
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74
Geo. L. J. 1313, 1327 1340 (1986); see also Woodrum v. Woodward
County, Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989); Vairo, Rule
11:

A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988).

And, in

a survey of civil cases in general in the Third Circuit, one
survey data found that reported decisions are only the "tip of
the iceberg" with respect to Rule 11.

See Third Circuit Task

Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 in Transition
59 (1989).
Another impact of Rule 11 that disproportionately affects
civil rights cases is that some district court judges interpret
it to mean that all arguments and subarguments fall within the
award of sanctions.

Civil rights attorneys, however, often are

called upon to make novel arguments to complement the statistical
data used to make a colorable claim of discrimination.

Further,

to show intent necessary to prove discrimination it is inevitable
that the civil rights attorney will not have a solid basis in

-22fact until discovery is far along in the process.

Or, civil

rights attorneys may have t6 call for an extension of existing
law or just the reverse.

District court judges must be mindful

that Rule 11 does not apply to the mere making of a frivolous
argument.

Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,

801 F.2d at 1540.

"The rule permits the imposition of sanctions

only when the "pleading, motion, or other paper" itself is
frivolous, not when one of the arguments in support of a pleading
or motion is frivolous.

Id.

Stated differently, "the fact that

the court concludes that one argument or sub-argument in support
of an otherwise valid motion, pleading, or other paper is
unmeritorious does not warrant a finding that the motion or
pleading is frivolous or that the Rule has been violated.

II

Id.

When mandatory sanctions ride upon close judicial decisions the
IIdanger of arbitrariness increases and the probability of uniform
enforcement declines."

Id.; See «

~,

Zaldivar v. City of Los

Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (we believe a plausible,
good faith argument can be made by a competent attorney to the
contrary); see also Davis v. Veslan Enterprises, 765 F.2d at 498
(tithe district court's determination to impose sanctions may
depend on whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based
on a plausible view of the law.''') (quoting comment to 1983
amendments); Eastway I, 762 F. 2d at 254 (" [W]here it is patently
clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the
existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be
advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands, Rule
11 has been violated."

Further, judges must be mindful that the
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subjective intent of the attorney or litigant is not a basis for
a Rule

11

violation when a complaint which complies with the

standard of being "well-grounded in fact and warranted by
law"), Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d at 832
(instructions to district court judges in making determinations
that the second prong of Rule 11 -- "not for improper purposes"
has been violated).

Moreover, the pleading or paper that is the

subject of the sanction is to be judged by what is known at the
time the pleading or paper is filed, and not by hindsight.
VI.

THE NIGBTHARE OF THE .APPLICATION OF RULE 11
TO A CIVIL RIGHTS CASE

Just recently, the Fourth Circuit overturned a district
.court decision which involved sanctions imposed on one of this
country's greatest civil rights advocates -- Julius LeVonne
Chambers, Executive Director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
See Blue v. U.S. Department of the Army, Slip Ope (NOS. 88-1364,
et seq.) (4th Cir., September 18, 1990).

In this case, the

plaintiffs accused the u.S. Army with wide-ranging acts of
discrimination in civil employment including:

hiring and

promotion criteria, pay practices, job assignments, job
performance, job evaluations, disciplinary actions, reductions in
workforce, and numerous aspects of on the job treatment.
trial proceeded with approximately 38 plaintiffs.

The

The parties

eventually reached a settlement in which the Army agreed to pay
all plaintiffs as a group $75,000, and a guarantee that it would
continue to implement its affirmative action in good faith.

The

court still was to adjudicate claims which it had already heard,

-24as well as all sanctions motions.

The court conducted extensive

sanctions hearings to determine the reasons why plaintiffs had
abandoned their claims and whether the claims were frivolous.

It

heard several weeks of testimony and argument by the parties.
The parties then reached a "final agreement" nullifying and
superseding the earlier settlement.

Pursuant to the final

agreement, the substantive claims of all except two plaintiffs,
Sandra Blue and Mattiebelle Harris, were dropped.

These two

plaintiffs were not included in settlement because they failed to
sign the final agreement.

However, still before the district

court were the merits of Blue's tried claims and the government's
motions for sanctions against Blue, Harris, and their counsel for
their abandoned claims.
Blue's discrimination

The district court ultimately rejected

cla~

as frivolous and, in a near 200-page

opinion, awarded sanctions totaling approximately $85,000,
apportioned as follows:

$17,000 against Harris, $13,000 against

Blue, $30,000 against Chambers, $12,000 against Chambers' young
law associate Geraldine Sumter, $1,414 against a North Carolina
law firm that had assisted Chambers in the case, and the
remainder against other attorneys involved in the case in lesser
capacities.

In calculating the amount of sanctions, the district

court included the salaries of the judge and law clerks as a
component of the sanction amount.

The district court also ruled

that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund could not be the source for
satisfying the payment of the sanctioned amount in this case.
But for the Fourth Circuit's heightened level of scrutiny
(despite not labeling it as such) of the district court judge's
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choice of sanctions in Harris v. Marsh, 679 F.Supp. 1204
(E.D.N.C. 1987), there is no doubt that there would have been a
chilling effect on civil rights advocacy.

As

noted by the Fourth

Circuit,
The district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the conduct warranted appropriate
sanctions. But, for reasons given earlier, we are
satisfied that the court then failed to exercise
sufficient selectivity in imposing wider, ongoing
sanctions than it chose and sufficient selectivity to
the deterrent effect its decision might create upon
future Title VII litigants with meritorious claims. In
our view, this did constitute an abuse of the court's
discretion which we are obliged to correct in the
exercise of our reviewing function.
Blue v. Department of the Army, supra.
The court's opinion underscores NBA's argument of how
sanctions can have a chilling impact on civil rights advocacy.
For example, with respect to the sanctions awarded. against
Sumter, the Fourth Circuit stated:

tlWe are unwilling to see the

career of a young attorney compromised at its inception because
she found herself cast virtually alone into a case which a team
of experienced lawyers would have deemed a daunting one."

Id.

With respect to the $30,000 total amount awarded against the
plaintiffs, including salaries of the court and its staff, the
court also underscored the NBA's position that one end result of
sanctions is that it can deter access to the courts.

"Imposing

the cost of judicial salaries ••• upon litigants is a sort of 'user
fee' sanction which may operate as an impediment to judicial
access for those with legitimate claims."

Id.

With respect to sanctions imposed on counsel for opposing
the sanctions motions, the Fourth Circuit's review found no
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sanctionable conduct in the attorney's opposition to the
sanctions motions.

Id.

The Fourth Circuit also found the

district court judge's award of sanctions against the plaintiff's
law firm improper which was based on the fact "that a number of
other lawyers with the firm participated in this case in varying
minor ways."

Id citing, Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. at 1392.
!

Moreover, the court also reversed the district court in its
I

indiscriminate choice of sanctions that ordered the NAACP Legal
i

Defense Fund not to pay any portion of the Chambers sanction
award.

"However well intehtioned the district court may have

been, a concern for how th~ Legal Defense Fund allocates its
monies is not a legitimate basis in which to order it not to pay
I

sanctions.

II

Id.

The district court's 9pinion demonstrates how the broad
discretion qranted district judges in imposing sanctions can have
I

far-reaching and highly damaging effects in a civil rights case.
I

This case reflects the real-life impact that the district court's
discretionary authority in limposing sanctions has over the
survival of the civil rightis attorney and his/her law practice.
Moreover, this case furtherl exemplifies the need for the Advisory
Committee to recognize, addpt and strongly advocate the use of
alternative, nonmonetary sanctions as a method for deterring
I

misconduct, particularly in, the area of civil rights cases, and
I

\discouraging the use by district court judges of monetary
I

sanctions on sole practitioners and small law firms.

As one

well-known civil rights attbrney has confided, "any Rule 11
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sanction [imposed on him], would force [him] into Chapter 11
Bankruptcy. "

VII.

INSURANCE AND CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEYS

Another major concern regarding Rule 11 is its effect on NBA
members and the issue of their malpractice insurance.

The

uncertainty as to what conduct constitutes a Rule 11 violation
inevitably prompts attorneys to wonder if they can run for cover
under their existing professional liability insurance policies.
Many insurance companies, however, expressly exclude "sanctions"
from coverage.

There are probably many civil rights attorneys

who carry no malpractice insurance.

A 1989 survey of 25

professional liability policies revealed that 14 have some form
of an exclusion for "sanctions.

1t

See Note - Insuring Rule 11

Sanctions, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 344, 364 n. 129 (Nov. 1989).
chilling effect.

What a

In representing poor clients, the civil rights

attorney suffers from the absence of prestige in both the
community and among the legal bar in practicing civil rights law.
When factoring in the potential exposure of sanctions under Rule
11, and the absence of insurance coverage, this is to say at the
very least, chilling.

That, coupled with difficulty that many

sole practitioners and small law firms already face in obtaining
malpractice insurance and paying its high premiums is driving
many attorneys away from the practice of civil rights law.
Further, the liability policies that cover sanctions will no
'.

,

doubt charge high premiums for attorneys who practice an area of
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law as civil rights, where there is a high risk of being
sanctioned under Rule 11.

As noted earlier, civil rights cases

tend to be implicated in Rule 11 sanctions more often than in any
other types of civil cases.

That fact, combined with the

unprofitability of practicing civil rights law makes for an
excellent reason to review the effect of Rule 11 sanctions on
civil rights attorneys.

Add the lack of insurance to the

equation, and the dearth of attorneys who practice civil rights
law, and the end result is the substantial denial of access to
the courts to the oppressed and disadvantaged seeking to
vindicate constitutional rights.

It must be remembered that the

right to counsel is not guaranteed in civil trials.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The deterrent effect of an award of attorney's fees depends
on the extent of the sanctioned party's resources.

In civil

rights cases, however, the plaintiff is usually poor or are
persons seeking court-appointed representation.

Secondly, The

deterrent effect of monetary sanctions is de minimis because the
civil rights litigants, on average, seldom resort to the legal
process more than once in their lifetime to vindicate a
constitutional right.

In reality, a monetary sanction serves no

deterrent effect for ,the civil rights litigant.

With respect to

the attorney, courts must be careful not to impose monetary
sanctions so great that they are punitive or that they might even
drive the sanctioned party out of practice.

See,~,

Napier v.

Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1094

-29n. 12 (3rd Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

Courts must be

mindful that "other proceedings such as disbarment exist to weed
out incompetent lawyers; Rule 11 was not entered for that
purpose, but rather to provide deterrence for abuses of the
system of litigation in federal district courts."

Doering v.

Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d at 196 n. 4.

In

the long run, the deterrent effect of the rule on attorneys in
civil rights cases results in chilling the advocacy for persons
in such areas.

There is more utility in educating the civil

rights client and attorney.
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